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22 JUN 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director (Plans)
Chief, Psychological and Paramilitary Staff

SUBJECT: Mr. Herter's Report to the Nation on Geneva


1. This memorandum is for action of the DCI. Such action is contained in paragraph 4.

2. As you know, Mr. Herter is scheduled to make a radio and television report to the Nation on Geneva at 9:00 P.M., Tuesday, June 23. Mr. Dillon's proposed draft of the Secretary's speech is attached.

3. You will recall that Mr. Archie S. Alexander recently suggested, and you agreed, that it would be desirable for the Secretary to include a restatement of our policy towards Eastern Europe on some appropriate occasion. We believe that Mr. Herter's speech Tuesday night is an ideal opportunity for such a statement.

4. We recommend that you ask Mr. Herter to add the following to paragraph 4, page 3 of the attached draft:

"We already have before us the Soviet domination of Eastern Europe as a constant reminder of these ambitions. This is an appropriate time to remind the Soviets and the captive peoples of East Europe that just as we rejected Soviet plans for Berlin and Germany, we also refuse to accept permanence of the status quo in Eastern Europe. We will continue to support the legitimate aspirations of the East European peoples for freedom."


CORD MEYER, JR.
Chief
International Organizations Division

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cc: DDCI

Attachment:
Draft of Mr. Herter's speech

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Tonight I wish to report to you where we stand after six weeks of discussion with the Soviet Union at Geneva and to look ahead a bit into the future.

As you all know we have not been able to come to any settlement with the Soviet Union of the issues which we discussed, even of a temporary nature. Under these circumstances we thought it best to adjourn the conference and to meet again in three weeks time.

I am sure we all have a sense of disappointment that we are able to record no progress whatsoever with the Soviet Union which might lead to a peaceful and honorable settlement of the problem of Germany and Berlin.

We did not, of course, enter the conference at Geneva with very high hopes. We have had many occasions in the past to learn how difficult and frustrating negotiation with the Soviet Union can be. But for our part we went to Geneva with the earnest purpose of negotiating in good faith. In the notes we exchanged with the Soviet Union before the conference, the Soviet Union promised to do the same. They did not live up to that pledge. They have shown once again their unwillingness to rely on the normal ways of transacting international business, by their refusal to deal in a spirit of genuine negotiation.

What we are trying to settle at Geneva is a piece of unfinished business left over from the end of the last war. We have always insisted that the division of Germany makes no sense. So long as Germany remains divided there will always be tension in Europe. The Soviet Union took advantage of their occupation of the eastern zone of Germany to impose their will on the

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unfortunate people of that area. They converted their zone of occupation into the all too familiar Soviet puppet state. On the principle of "what I have, I keep" they as yet stubbornly refuse to consider any proposal consistent with the free choice of the German people for bringing the two parts of Germany together in freedom.

I emphasize this problem of the division of Germany because it is at the heart of the issue which the Soviet Union raised last November when it first precipitated this crisis over Berlin. Berlin was once and, if the German people so desire, should again be the capital of all of Germany. The problem of Berlin would no longer exist if the Soviet Union were willing to loosen its grip on Eastern Germany, and permit it to become part of a natural German state.

Instead Berlin is a city 110 miles inside Communist territory. Like Germany itself, it is divided into two parts. One third of the city has been artificially detached from the rest, and the world's most senseless border has been drawn crazily through the middle of the city. A persistent effort has been made to turn this border into a barrier between two civilizations.

We and our British and French Allies continue to fulfil our responsibilities in West Berlin. We maintain a very small number of our troops there to protect the city. Under the shield of that protection the Western part of the city has become a model of freedom and peace, of order and progress. It is precisely because West Berlin is an island of freedom in the midst of a sea of Communism that the Russians are now bending every effort to engulf the city.

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For what the Soviet Union is after, stripped of the propaganda trappings, amounts to a demand that we get out of the city and leave the free people of West Berlin exposed to an inevitable Communist take over without any effective means of protection.

We must remember to think what this means in human terms. As I pointed out at Geneva, the population of Berlin is greater than that of one-fifth of the member countries of the United Nations. To put it in terms closer to home, over half of the states of the United States have fewer people than there are in the free parts of Berlin.

We and our Allies have a deep moral obligation to these people that they may continue to choose their own way of life. We cannot surrender them to Communist rule. We cannot permit the city to be swallowed up.

But the problem is larger than that. The Soviet objective is not just Berlin, it is all of Germany. If the West yields on Berlin, the problem is not solved. The pressure would then be on West Germany and of course, eventually on West Europe. The ambitions of International Communism are not modest. (ADD)

In this brief report I will not try to recall the long and painful history of our dealings with the Soviet Union since the war over the problem of Germany and Berlin. I do, however, wish to remind you that this is not the first time the Soviet Union has tried to force the three Western Allies out of Berlin. In the spring of 1948 the Soviet Union blockaded the city in an effort to force the Western powers out of Berlin and

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to starve its people into submission to their will. This effort was a failure. The Soviet Union failed because the Allies had the facilities to break the blockade. We mounted the now historic airlift which kept the city going. The people of West Berlin, who were the victims of this barbaric siege, made clear their will to resist. By the spring of 1949, the Soviet Union realized that the Western powers had no intention of abandoning Berlin and that they could not break the spirit of the people. They concluded agreements with the Western powers confirming Western rights to unrestricted access to the city.

I recall this episode, which is now ten years old, because there is a real lesson in it. If we were not ready to be forced out of Berlin ten years ago, we are even less ready now. This is a central point of our policy, which needs to be emphasized again and again. Until other arrangements are made which will genuinely safeguard the welfare of the people of West Berlin, we do not propose to abandon our commitment to them.

I stress this point because it is at the heart of the problem. It is the point which I hope the Soviet Union will recognize. Until they do, there is no prospect that we can come to any new arrangements over Berlin.

The Soviet technique for getting us out of Berlin is to propose to us that we agree on a time limit by which we will leave the city. While they pretend to use the normal means of diplomacy they have at the same time consistently tried to coerce us by the threat of unilateral action which they will take within a fixed time limit unless we accept their proposals.

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This has been the Soviet method since they generated this crisis last November. They gave us six months then to agree to their proposal that Berlin be converted into what they called a free city, by which they meant a city free of the protection of Allied forces, and exposed to the pressures and inroads of the Communist-dominated area surrounding it. This ultimatum they later retracted, and on this understanding we began negotiations. But this was not the end of Soviet ultimatums. During the course of discussions at Geneva, they resorted once again to this technique of threat to take action unless we agreed to proposals which the Soviet Union knew we could not accept without sacrificing basic principle. This time they expressed their willingness to let us remain in Berlin for a year. Later they extended that period to 18 months. What the Soviet Union deliberately fails to understand is that we will not agree to leave Berlin under any circumstances which will leave the people of West Berlin exposed to the fate which has befallen the millions of people all over the world who are forced to live under the tyranny of Communist regimes.

We rejected the repeated threats with which we were confronted, and tried very hard to find a fair solution. In spite of the threats we have gone to great lengths in an attempt to meet the Soviet Union half way. During this recess period we shall continue to study the lessons of the past six weeks.

I do not now wish to prejudge the future course of the negotiations. One thing I can say. We will continue in good faith our attempts to find an

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area of agreement. But in so doing, we will never compromise the freedom of the brave people of West Berlin, who rightfully look to us for their protection. Past and future Soviet threats or action will not shake us in our determination to carry out our obligations honorably. We have refused to negotiate under duress in the past. We will not do so in the future.

One cheering element in this otherwise gloomy picture is the continuing unity of our Allies. This unity has withstood the test of Soviet pressures and threats designed to divide us from our British, French and other NATO Allies.


What are our responsibilities in the face of the critical situation the Soviet Union has brought about? First and foremost, we and our Allies must stand fast in the defense of our principles. If history teaches anything, it teaches that weakness and appeasement will not avert the danger of war. Our fate and the fate of the people of West Berlin and the fate of the free people everywhere are linked together. When their freedom is diminished, our freedom is likewise diminished. We must continue to show the courage required to defend our precious heritage of freedom.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FOR THE PRESS

JUNE 23, 1959



NO. 450

CAUTION - FUTURE RELEASE

FOR RELEASE AT 9:00 P.M., E.D.T., TUESDAY, JUNE 23, 1959.
NOT TO BE PREVIOUSLY PUBLISHED, QUOTED FROM, OR USED
IN ANY WAY.

REPORT TO THE NATION
ON THE GENEVA FOREIGN MINISTERS CONFERENCE
BY
THE HONORABLE CHRISTIAN A. HERTER
SECRETARY OF STATE

(The Secretary's address will be carried live by the National Broadcasting Company's and the Columbia Broadcasting System's combined radio and television networks at 9:00 p.m., E.D.T. The Secretary's address will also be carried live by the American Broadcasting Company's Radio Network and by the Mutual Broadcasting System at 9:00 p.m., E.D.T. The address will be carried on a delayed basis on the American Broadcasting Company's Television Network at 10:30 p.m., E.D.T.)

I.

Fellow Americans. President Eisenhower has asked me to report to you tonight on where we stand after six weeks of the Geneva talks with the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union.

I regret to say that no significant progress was made toward settlement of the problem of the continued division of Germany and of Berlin.

My Western colleagues and I did not go to Geneva with any high hopes. We knew how difficult it is to negotiate with the Soviet Union, but we negotiated earnestly and in good faith. The Soviets gave no indication of being interested in genuine negotiation. They engaged in a good deal of propaganda and some threats. Once again they demonstrated that they are not willing to rely on normal methods of transacting international business.

II.

The long-range Soviet aim is to keep Germany divided until the possibility exists of a single German state under Communist influence. The Soviet Union has year after year refused to allow the issue of German reunification to be put to the free electoral choice of the German people.

As long as Germany remains unnaturally divided, there will be a continued threat to the peace of the world.

The problem of Berlin arises from this continued division of Germany. The Berlin issue can only be solved finally when Germany is reunified.

III.

We put forward at Geneva a Western Peace Plan, designed to bring about the reunification of Germany. This plan was carefully phased into progressive arrangements for European security. It was especially designed to meet Soviet objections to previous Western plans for German unification. It provided for reunification of the country in a manner which would safeguard the best interests of the German people and of the other nations concerned.

The Soviets flatly rejected the Western Peace Plan. They would not even consider it as a basis for discussion. Instead they proposed that a peace treaty be signed with two German governments -- the Federal Republic of Germany and the Communist regime, the so-called German Democratic Republic. By some curious logic which was never explained, Foreign Minister Gromyko argued that by thus making two peace settlements, the cause of one Germany would be advanced. On the contrary it seemed to us that the Soviet plan would assure the permanent partition of Germany.

IV.

You will recall that last November the Soviet Union presented the Western Powers with a threatening proposal for what they called a "Free City" status for West Berlin. If we did not accept it, the USSR said it would abandon its obligations to us in regard to Berlin.

In our judgment, this proposal could only have led to the absorption of West Berlin into the Communist empire. Foreign Minister Gromyko frankly admitted at Geneva that this was the Berlin solution which the USSR would like to see.

It would sever West Berlin economic and political ties with West Germany. It would make West Berlin more and more dependent on the Communist system which surrounds it. It would deprive West Berlin of the protection afforded by the Western forces -- either by eliminating them or reducing them drastically and by introducing Soviet forces into West Berlin. It would have required a major Western withdrawal from which the world would have drawn the lesson that Soviet brute strength was the ruling force in that part of Europe.

The Soviets called their proposal for West Berlin a proposal for a "Free City". By this they meant a city free of the protection of Allied forces and exposed to the pressures and inroads of the Communist area surrounding it. This was a typical example of Communist upside-down talk. The Soviets would take what is now in fact a free city and make it like East Berlin which is now in fact a slave city.

We must remember what this would mean in human terms. West Berlin's population of more than two million is greater than the population of almost 20% of the member nations of the United Nations. Over half the states in the United States have fewer people than there are in West Berlin. The value of goods and services produced in West Berlin last year exceeded that of more than half of the member nations of the United Nations.

How did the West Berliners themselves react to the Soviet proposal? Within a few weeks, West Berlin elections showed that 98% of the voters supported parties whose programs called for the continued presence of the Western forces in Berlin. The courage these people exhibited is but a repetition of the courage they displayed at the time of the Soviet blockade ten years ago. You may be sure that we will stand by people who stand by themselves.

The Western Powers rejected this Soviet proposal and its associated threat.

Because Berlin is divided into a free part and a Communist part, its situation is certainly not ideal. The Western Powers made serious proposals to the Soviet Union for an interim settlement on Berlin which would ensure the stability of the city until Germany is reunified. These proposals would have offered a basis for agreement if the real Soviet concern had been to reduce tension over Berlin.

Agreement was not reached, however, because of one crucial obstacle: Foreign Minister Gromyko refused time and time again to discuss Western proposals until the Soviet proposed new status for the city had been agreed to. That new status was the so-called "Free City" which was as unacceptable to us as when it was first put forward last November.

In the later stages of our talks about Berlin, the Soviets once again introduced threatening proposals. They called on the Western Powers to agree to a time limit, after which our rights to protect West Berlin would expire.

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They proposed a one-year extension, which later, with a show of mock generosity, they increased to eighteen months. We made it clear that the Western Powers were no more interested in negotiating under threat in the Spring than in the Fall.

While the Foreign Ministers were negotiating, the baneful influence of statements outside the Conference by Mr. Khrushchev was clearly felt. On one occasion he stated that the Western seven-point program for Berlin did not contain a single element for negotiation. Then just before Mr. Gromyko presented his final paper Mr. Khrushchev made a speech in Moscow in which he repeated previous Soviet threats to abandon their responsibilities to the Western Powers concerning Berlin. These statements, reflected in the Soviet attitude at Geneva, made our attempts to negotiate practically fruitless.

V.

President Eisenhower has made quite clear his willingness to attend a meeting of the Heads of Government if such a meeting holds out some prospect of success. We believe that some degree of progress in the Geneva negotiations is necessary if there is to exist such a prospect of success. Regretfully, no such progress has as yet been registered at Geneva.

VI.

Did any good come out of the first session of the Conference? I believe so. The Western Peace Plan for the reunification of Germany has met with widespread approval around the world. History will, I believe, judge it to be a significant political offer looking to the solution of the key German problem. A study of this proposal shows that the Western allies are willing to go the "extra mile", of which President Eisenhower spoke in his State of the Union message this year, in order to make peace more secure. I still hope that the Soviet Union will give serious second thought to this proposal.

In addition, the Geneva talks demonstrated a high degree of unity among the Western allies. Allied unity was maintained from start to finish, and was, if anything, even more solid at the end than at the beginning.

Finally, the Conference revealed possible areas of agreement concerning specific arrangements for Berlin. I believe that it may be possible to build on these areas of agreement if the Soviet Union is prepared to accept the continued existence of a free West Berlin under Western protection.

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This is the critical question. If the Soviet Union persists in its determination to add more than two million free West Berliners to the captive peoples of Eastern Europe, then no agreement is possible. However, if the Soviets do not hold to this annexationist design, we should be able to reach agreements on Berlin consistent with the honor and interest of all our countries.

We again take up the Geneva talks on July 13. We will continue our efforts to find an area of agreement, but the United States will never compromise the freedom of the brave people of West Berlin who have placed their faith in our protection. Our fate and the fate of the people of West Berlin and that of free people everywhere are linked together. When their freedom is diminished, our freedom is inevitably diminished.

The path to a just peace will be long and difficult. But I know that I speak for all of you when I say that we will continue with the patience and understanding and firmness needed to travel that path so long as it remains open.

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State -- FD, Wash., D.C.

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